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In 2010, as a consequence of the financial crisis, the European Commission (EC) developed the Europe 
2020 strategy. Within this strategy the EC emphasized re-industrialization and set the goal to enlarge the 
European manufacturing share of the gross domestic product (GDP) from 14% to 20% by 2020. The inten-
tion was to achieve a stronger international competitiveness and to increase the job creation potentials of 
the European labor markets. Several initiatives were founded on EU and on country level. 
This analysis based on literature and empirical data shows that it is more than doubtful if the EU can reach 
the proclaimed re-industrialization aim. Poland is the only EU member country with a clear re-industri-
alization trend since 2000. Furthermore, the influence of industrialization on growth seems to depend 
on the size of the manufacturing share. A direct statistical connection between re-industrialization and 
employment could not be calculated. De-industrializing countries like Sweden or the United Kingdom also 
recovered from the financial crisis within two years and had growth rates above average since that time. 
Hence the manufacturing share alone might not generally be the decisive variable for growth and employ-
ment. It seems therefore questionable if the re-industrialization aim of the EC is equally appropriate for all 
EU countries.
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1.  Introduction
During the financial crisis the production in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) decreased by 10% and three mil-
lion industrial jobs were lost (European Commis-
sion, 2012: 4)1. Shortly after the crisis, the European 
Commission (EC) emphasized the significance of 
manufacturing for the development of the Europe-
an economy, because every fourth job was directly 
in this sector and one more indirectly depended on 
it. Therefore the EC stressed the “…importance of a 
strong, competitive and diversified industrial man-
ufacturing value chain for the EU’s competitiveness 
and job-creation potential.” (European Commis-
sion, 2010)2 and proclaimed a re-industrialization 
aim to increase the share of manufacturing of the 
GDP from 14% in 2010 to 20% in 2020. 
Since the 1970s the globalization of the value chain 
through offshoring, either via foreign direct invest-
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ment or via global sourcing, has been a widespread 
internationalization strategy, especially in manu-
facturing. Since the early 1990s concerns started to 
be raised about employment impacts (Hurley, Stor-
rie, 2017: 3)3. In recent years, reshoring as a revision 
of former offshoring decisions gained attention in 
the media, academic research and especially in the 
political debate (Backer et al., 2016: 2; Naudé et al., 
2019: 4).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate to which extent 
the stated re-industrialization target of the EC is 
reached until now by looking at the development 
of the manufacturing share in the EU as a whole 
and in different member states. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the influence of the manufacturing share 
on growth and employment is carried out to evalu-
ate the effects of re-industrialization on these two 
variables. This paper proceeds as follows: Section 
2 gives a brief overview of the used definitions, as 
well as the political and theoretical background. 
Section 3 explains the data basis and the methodol-
ogy. Section 4 comprises the empirical findings. It 
starts with a descriptive look at the development of 
the manufacturing share, growth and employment 
on country level. After that, the available data for 
reshoring from the literature are analyzed. Further-
more, the European countries are clustered and 
compared taking into account variables character-
izing the macroeconomic and institutional frame-
work. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 
5.
2. Theoretical background 
Industrialization, re-industrialization and de-in-
dustrialization are defined by the changes of the 
manufacturing share in the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and/or domestic employment (Tregenna, 
2011: 5; Peneder, Streicher, 2018: 88; Naudé et al., 
2019: 3). This paper follows the EC approach and 
focuses on the GDP share. Offshoring means gener-
ally producing abroad via foreign direct investments 
(FDI) or global sourcing (WTO, 2005: 266–267)4. 
The European Commission5 defines reshoring as 
relocation of parts of the production process previ-
ously offshored to another country. It differentiates 
between nearshoring as the relocation to a site near 
the home country and backshoring as relocation to 
the home country itself.
Re- and de-industrialization are integral compo-
nents of economies’ structural change. In the lit-
erature, one can find several approaches to explain 
the drivers of these changes, like different income 
elasticities of the demand side or technological 
developments through innovation (Gabardo et al., 
2017: 400). 
Based on a Keynesian perspective Kaldor (1966) 
analyzed the influence of manufacturing on eco-
nomic growth. According to Kaldor’s first law, the 
growth rate of the real GDP depends on manufac-
turing growth. In his model, manufacturing is the 
sector with the highest static and dynamic returns 
to scale, the highest productivity gains and capi-
tal accumulation (Keho, 2018: 1). Hence the costs 
for manufacturing products fall and due to high 
income elasticity for manufacturing goods the de-
mand increases. With a demand growth higher 
than productivity gains the sector requires more 
labor. The additional workforce is absorbed from 
the other sectors having lower returns to scale 
or a weak relation between employment growth 
and output growth (Thirlwall, 2018: 26). Wages in 
manufacturing are above average, so the increasing 
income leads again to a higher demand. The ex-
panding demand for manufacturing goods induces 
further innovation, technological progress (Rome-
ro, 2019: 37) and human capital creation through 
learning-by-doing (Tregenna, 2011: 5). Spillover 
effects of output growth in manufacturing lead to 
productivity growth in other sectors (Di Meglio et 
al., 2018: 1496). When the productivity gains of the 
economy through manufacturing growth diminish 
and the domestic market for commodities grows 
more and more saturated, the GDP growth slows 
down. Kaldor’s first law could be confirmed in 
several empirical analyses using different data and 
methods for different country groups and time se-
ries (Keho, 2018: 1).
The development stage of an economy plays a 
major role in this regard. Due to the productiv-
ity effect, industrialization takes place during 
an early stage of development whereas in highly 
developed countries there is a trend towards de-
industrialization (Stijepic, Wagner, 2017: 103). It 
is well known that Fourastié already in 1949 de-
scribed the development stages of economies with 
an increasing income per capita. Economies are 
transformed from mainly agricultural societies to 
industrialized countries and later to service econ-
omies. Drivers on the demand side are changes of 
income elasticities and saturation effects, whereas 
on the supply side it is different sectoral produc-
tivity developments that drive the transformation. 
In highly developed economies, only a higher de-
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mand from foreign markets can again lead to high-
er production and employment in manufacturing, 
increases in productivity and a higher competi-
tiveness (Thirlwall, 2018: 27).
Romer (1990) developed an endogenous growth 
model in which increasing returns to scale are ex-
plained by increased division of labor and innova-
tion spillover effects (Gabardo et al., 2017: 397). 
Growth results from the research sector, in which 
new designs are produced by human capital. In-
novations are in the long run non-rival goods. In 
the short run, innovating companies have a tempo-
rary monopoly from which they temporarily gain 
monopoly rents. These rents are the incentives for 
further innovations. The determinants of sectoral 
development therefore are innovations and the ac-
cumulation of human capital. 
Since the early 1990s trade liberalization, upcom-
ing emerging markets like China and India, as well 
as market opening of countries, which were at that 
time still in transition, changed the production 
process in manufacturing. Today the manufactur-
ing sector is characterized by fragmentation and 
internationalization of the value chain with conse-
quences for international trade. Companies interact 
with international suppliers trading goods, services, 
technology and information (Timmer et al., 2019: 
1). International trade is shifting towards an in-
creased trade with intermediates (Stijepic, Wagner, 
2017: 104). Offshoring of tasks within the supply 
chain of multinational companies (MNCs) change 
the comparative advantages of economies (van 
Neuss, 2019: 318). All these trends influence both 
re- and de-industrialization. The eclectic theory of 
Dunning is the most frequently used theoretical 
framework for analyzing internationalization strat-
egies of companies like offshoring (Di Mauro et al., 
2018: 109). 
Dunning (1977) introduced the eclectic paradigm 
(EP) to research the international allocation of re-
sources through FDI. The kernels of his so-called 
OLI paradigm are three main interdependent de-
terminants: ownership advantage (O-advantage), 
location advantage (L-advantage) and internaliza-
tion advantage (I-advantage). Beginning with the 
static related activities, the O-advantages result 
from different company-specific assets like pat-
ents, brands or trademarks, but can also result 
from economies of scale or international transfer 
pricing. Consisting of particularities related to a 
specific country, L-advantages can be the differ-
ent prices associated with important input factors 
as well as economic or political frame conditions. 
I-advantages describe the ability of a company to 
exploit and co-ordinate both the O- and L-advan-
tages (Dunning (1980: 10). In the dynamic per-
spective, O-advantages result from technological, 
managerial, organizational or institutional compe-
tence and are relatively mobile. The L-advantages 
arise from assets of a country or region, which are 
location bounded and important for an MNC to 
be able to exploit the ownership advantages they 
have. The I-advantages emerge from the compe-
tences of the firm to realize O- and L-advantages 
better via hierarchy than through market transac-
tions (Dunning, 2003: 4).
For the first time in the internationalization theory, 
Dunning combined internal O- and I-advantages of 
companies with the external L-advantage (Calvelli, 
Cannavale, 2019: 10). The location advantages of for-
eign markets are generally available for all MNE pro-
ducing and sourcing there, but the creation of com-
petitive advantages out of these conditions requires 
firm-specific capabilities (Theyel et al., 2018: 301). 
3. Methodology and data
Based on the proclaimed aims of the EC and the 
theoretical background the following research 
questions can be derived: 
1. Are there in the EU countries trends to-
wards re-industrialization to observe and 
can the manufacturing share in the EU 
reach the proclaimed 20% aim by 2020?
2. Did countries with a higher manufacturing 
share generally overcome the consequences 
of the financial crisis for growth and em-
ployment more quickly than others? 
3. Does the manufacturing share generally 
have a significant influence on growth and 
employment?
4. Which European economies are similar to 
each other looking at selected macroeco-
nomic and institutional determinants, re-
flecting L-advantages?
For answering the first two questions, a descriptive 
analysis of the development of the manufacturing 
share in the EU countries as well as growth and 
employment is carried out on the basis of Euro-
stat data6. The EU countries are therefore grouped 
by their manufacturing share. These results give 
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also some hints about the hypothesis that coun-
tries with a higher manufacturing share are more 
robust against external shocks like the financial 
crisis. The description is complemented by curve 
fit regression analyses of the development of the 
manufacturing share over time with manufactur-
ing share as the dependent variable and time as 
the independent variable to calculate the trend of 
re- or de-industrialization in the EU in total and in 
each of the member countries. All statistics were 
calculated with IBM SPSS Statistics 24. The review 
period is generally 2000 to 2018 despite the fact 
that the EC proclaimed the re-industrialization 
aim in 2010. At that time, several countries had 
already overcome the financial crisis while oth-
ers needed more time. Hence the influence of the 
business cycle could overlay the trend in this time 
period. For the third question, a correlation analy-
sis is carried out for all EU countries and for the 
country groups with a manufacturing share above 
and below average. 
Finally, a cluster analysis it carried out with regard 
to selected macroeconomic variables reflecting as-
pects of the L-advantage, which are influenced by 
the respective economic policies of the countries. 
Therefore, data from the Global Competitiveness 
Report for institutions, labor costs and infrastruc-
ture (for a detailed description see Schwab, 2018)7 
and the country ratings published by Standard and 
Poor’s for 2019 (CountryEconomy, 2019)8 are taken 
into account. A comparison between the groups 
formed according to their manufacturing share and 
the cluster analysis show the influence of the L-
advantage of the country-specific macroeconomic 
and institutional framework. 
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Manufacturing share
A look at the actual statistics shows clearly that it 
is more than questionable if the EU can reach the 
aim of a 20% manufacturing share by 2020. With 
regard to the period 2000–2018, the average man-
ufacturing share in all EU 28 countries decreased 
from 16.7% to 13.3 % in 2009 during the financial 
crisis and recovered again to 14.6% in 2018. The 
data show that the development of the manufactur-
ing share in the EU28 and in the member countries 
is influenced by the business cycle, especially by 
the financial crisis. The EU in total shows a slight 
trend towards de-industrialization, given a decline 
of the manufacturing share since 2000. The average 
in 2018 is used to group the EU countries into those 
with a share above and below average (see Figure 1). 
With a 30.8% manufacturing share Ireland ranks 
the highest in 2018, followed by Czechia, Germany, 
Slovenia, Romania and Slovakia, all with a share of 
20% or above. 
In 2000, this group was slightly different, Finland 
had the highest manufacturing share with 24.2%, 
followed by Czechia (23.6%), Ireland (23.1%), Slo-
venia (21.8%), Slovakia (21.4%), Germany (20.7%) 
and Sweden (20.3%). The country with the largest 
reduction was Finland, which decreased its share 
by nine percentage points, followed by Sweden and 
Belgium. In these three countries a trend to de-in-
dustrialization can be observed.
Ireland has also had a high dynamic GDP growth, 
which has tripled since 1995, whereas the export 
share of the GDP has grown sixfold. During this 
process, the manufacturing share increased by 
nearly eight percentage points. The main rea-
sons for this re-industrialization are seen in the 
high degree of openness of the country, the low 
corporate tax of 12.5% and high FDI inflows dur-
ing the last twenty years. The Irish gross value 
added (GVA) is dominated by MNCs (Casey, 
2019: 11). In Czechia, the manufacturing share 
is nearly constant with slight fluctuations. That 
is also true for Germany, where the automotive 
industry, the machinery industry and the chemi-
cal industry are the largest branches, all with an 
export share of more than 50%. Czechia, Slovakia 
and Romania are traditional nearshore destina-
tions for manufacturing. 
Above average but below 20% is the manufacturing 
share of Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Fin-
land and Italy. Hungary and Poland also belong to 
the traditional nearshore countries. The Italian in-
dustry is characterized by small and medium sized, 
often family-owned companies. The strength of the 
manufacturing sector lies in machinery goods, tex-
tile and clothing as well as the agricultural and food 
industries. Italy is particularly well known for lux-
ury products like famous fashion brands and cars 
(Kangur, 2018: 11). Main industries in the Austrian 
manufacturing sector are machinery, automotive, 
agricultural and food production.
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Figure 1 Development of the share of manufacturing (s) 2000 to 2018*
* The development of s is shown in comparison with the EU28 average in 2018  
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 20196
The regression analyses show a statistically sig-
nificant trend to de-industrialization in the EU 28 
since 2000 (see Figure 2 and Figure 7). For Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia the regression results are not 
significant. A clear trend towards re- or de-indus-
trialization could not be identified. For Germany, 
the plot line is nearly a horizontal straight line, but 
the fluctuations are too high for a statistically signif-
icant result. All the other countries with the excep-
tion of Poland have also de-industrialized. Poland 
is the only EU member country with a clear trend 
of re-industrialization (see Figure 7, Table 5 in the 
Appendix). 
Hence a trend towards re-industrialization can’t 
be observed all EU countries. It is doubtful if the 
manufacturing share in the EU will reach the pro-
claimed 20% aim by 2020.
Figure 2 Curve fit regression for the EU
  Observation,       Fit line 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 20196 
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4.2 GDP growth
The growth between 2000 and 2018 is influenced by 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the Euro crisis 
starting from 2010. The causes and effects of both 
crises have been extensively analyzed in the litera-
ture. Therefore, the following description focuses on 
the potential influence of the manufacturing share 
on GDP growth. Generally, countries with a manu-
facturing share higher than 20% overcame the crises 
comparably quickly and reached the GDP level of 
2006/2007 again in 2011 or 2012 with the exemption 
of Slovenia, where it took until 2015 (see Table 1 for 
the EU28 average, Figure 3 for countries). 
For all other country groups the results are mixed. 
The GDP growth of the countries with a manufac-
turing share between 20% and 14.6% is above av-
erage in Lithuania, Hungary and Poland, around 
average in Austria and below average in Finland 
and Italy. In both of the latter countries there are 
dropping manufacturing shares in the same period.
Among the countries with a manufacturing share 
between 14.6% and 10%, Estonia and Latvia had the 
highest growth and reached over 130 points in 2018 
(2010=100). Bulgaria had an impressive growth too 
coming from 64 to 120 points in 2018. The Swed-
ish growth rate was also above average. All four 
countries were affected by the crises, but reached 
the pre-crisis level of 2006/2007 by 2012 and 2013 
respectively; their rates are on par with the coun-
tries with an above average manufacturing share of 
more than 20%. The growth rates in Denmark and 
Belgium are comparable to the EU 28 average, but 
it took Denmark until 2014 to reach the pre-crisis 
level, whereas Belgium reached that level already in 
2010. Portugal, Spain and Croatia grew below aver-
age and it took Spain until 2017 and Portugal until 
2018 to reach the level of 2007. Croatia has not yet 
reached the level of 2007.
Among the countries with a manufacturing share 
of less than 10%, Malta had the highest growth 
and overcame the financial crisis within one year. 
The United Kingdom and Luxembourg also had an 
above average growth and recovered by 2012 and 
2011 respectively. The economic development in 
France is in line with the EU 28 average. As com-
monly known, Greece suffered the most during the 
financial crisis and was a main contributor to the 
Euro crisis, due to the country’s dramatic indebted-
ness of both the government and the private sector.
Table 1 GDP growth rate in the EU 28 (2000 to 2018, 2010 = 100)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EU - 28 87.0 89.0 90.2 91.4 93.7 95.7 98.8 101.9 102.4 98.0
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EU - 28 100.0 101.8 101.4 101.6 103.5 105.9 108.0 110.7 113.0
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 20196 
Figure 3 GDP growth rate 2000 to 2018 (2010 = 100) 
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Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 20196 
Figure 4 shows the growth rates of the gross value 
added (GVA) in comparison with manufacturing. 
One can see clearly that in twenty EU countries the 
growth rates of manufacturing were higher than the 
ones of the total GVA. The exemptions are Cyprus, 
Finland and France with a growth below average in 
both total and manufacturing specific terms, and 
a manufacturing growth that is smaller than that 
of the GVA. In Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom the manufacturing 
growth lies under the total, but the GVA itself grew 
above average.
4.3 Employment
In all countries with a manufacturing share above 
20% the unemployment rate in 2018 was below the 
EU 28 average of 7% (see Figure 5). Worth mention-
ing is the decline of unemployment in Slovakia, 
where the rate decreased from 18.9% in 2000 to 
6.6% in 2018. Ireland showed a high crisis sensitiv-
ity, the unemployment rate rose from 5.0% in 2007 
to 15.5% in 2012, and then sunk gradually to 5.8% 
in 2018. Germany started in 2000 with an unem-
ployment rate of 7.9%, which increased over time 
to 11.2% in 2005. Due to the labor market reforms 
of the Agenda 2010 (Schneider and Zimmermann, 
2010) and the positive economic development, this 
rate was brought down to 3.4% in 2018. It is remark-
able that the unemployment rate was nearly stable 
during the financial crisis. The German Council of 
Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begu-
tachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 
2012: 20–21)9 attributes this development to two 
main aspects: the labor market reforms mentioned 
above and the institutional reaction of the German 
government with more flexible working hours and 
more opportunities for short-time working. In the 
1990’s and early 2000’s several German companies 
offshored parts of the value chain to foreign coun-
tries. During the crisis, companies kept their skilled 
German personnel and adjusted their labor force 
in foreign subsidiaries because it was more cost-
efficient. The unemployment in Czechia, Romania, 
and Slovenia developed on a lower level nearly par-
allel to the EU 28 average.
The situation differs when looking at the other 
groups, similarly to the one of the growth rate. In 
the group of countries with a manufacturing share 
between 20% and 14.6% the unemployment rate 
was the lowest in Hungary and Poland with 3.7% 
and 3.9% respectively. In this group, Poland was the 
most successful because in 2000 the unemployment 
rate was 16.1% and among the highest in the EU. 
In Greece unemployment today is still the highest 
at 19.3% followed by Spain with 15.3%, France with 
9.1% and Croatia with 8.5%. 
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Figure 4 Gross value added growth, 2018* (2010=100)
* The lines mark the EU 28 average 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat, 20196.
The employment growth of the EU 28 (see Figure 
6) lies below the growth rate of the GDP, reflecting 
an increase in labor productivity (107, 2010=100). 
In the countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later 
(Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Ro-
mania, Slovakia and Slovenia), but also in Portugal, 
the growth rate of the employment in manufactur-
ing was higher than in the economy in total. Hence 
in all the other countries the employment increase 
was higher in non-manufacturing sectors. 
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Figure 5 Unemployment rate 2000 to 2018 (2010 = 100)
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 20196.
Figure 6 Development of Employment 2000 to 2018 (2010 = 100)
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat, 20196.
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In conclusion of the descriptive analysis, there are 
some aspects which indicate that the manufacturing 
share influences the economic development of the 
EU countries. A Pearson’s correlation analysis over all 
EU member countries shows a significant correlation 
of the manufacturing share with the GDP growth and 
manufacturing employment both for persons and 
hours worked (see Table 2). For the total employment 
and the unemployment rates the correlation is not 
significant. For countries with a share of manufac-
turing below average there are no significant correla-
tions assessed. In contrast, for countries with a share 
of manufacturing above average the correlation is 
significant for growth, total hours worked and hours 
worked in manufacturing. The influence of manu-
facturing on macroeconomic variables depends, as 
expected, on the size of the share. One can conclude 
that it is not a necessity to increase the manufacturing 
share to achieve rising growth and employment and 
to overcome a crisis in a relatively short time. 
Table 2 Correlations between manufacturing share, employment and growth









Total Manufacturing Total Manufacturing 
Correlation 
coefficient 1 0.462* -0.316 -0.064 0.567** 0.015 0.623**
Sig. (2-sided) 0.012 0.095 0.740 0.001 0.940 0.000
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 29









Total Manufacturing Total Manufacturing 
Correlation 
coefficient 1 0.166 0.010 -0.397 0.144 -0.398 0.187
Sig. (2-sided) 0.539 0.971 0.128 0.595 0.127 0.488
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16









Total Manufacturing Total Manufacturing 
Correlation 
coefficient 1 0.762
** -0.434 0.498 0.502 0.668* 0.665*
Sig. (2-sided) 0.004 0.158 0.099 0.096 0.018 0.018
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
** Correlation is significant on the 0.01 level 
* Correlation is significant on the 0.05 level 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat, 20196 
4.4 Country clusters 
The cluster analysis classifies the European coun-
tries into similar groups. Therefore the previously 
used variable was enhanced by manufacturing la-
bor costs, the GCI for institutions, skills and in-
frastructure, and the Standard and Poor’s country 
rating. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed the 
number of clusters to be six. In the next step, a K-
means cluster analysis was performed (see Table 
3).
In the cluster analysis, the country groups are 
formed according to the distance of the variables be-
tween them. SPSS gives for each ANOVA table (see 
Table 4) in a cluster analysis the hint that the F-test 
can only be used for descriptive purposes. Nonethe-
less, the differences between the F-ratios show the 
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influence of the different variables in building the 
clusters. Obviously, the growth rate has the highest 
influence followed by labor costs in manufacturing 
and the Standard & Poor’s rating. The share of manu-
facturing had only a low influence. That is also true 
for the development of the total employment. The 
CGI infrastructure was more or less ignored. 
Obviously, the country clusters differ from the 
groups built by the manufacturing share. Ireland 
(1) and Greece (6) are each in a separate cluster on 
their own. Ireland has high growth in both in GDP 
and employment, a moderate unemployment rate 
and lies in the upper field of the GCI variables and 
the country rating. For Greece the situation is the 
opposite. The second cluster contains most of the 
Western European countries. They are all stable in 
a majority of the macroeconomic variables, have 
comparably high labor costs and a country ranking 
of at least AA, but the importance of manufacturing 
in these economies differs a lot. Cluster 3 is com-
posed of countries that joined the EU in 2004 with 
a manufacturing share above average, comparably 
low labor costs combined with sufficient skills and 
mostly rated between AA– and A-, the exception 
being Hungary with BBB. Besides Malta, Estonia 
and Lithuania, these countries are all traditional 
nearshoring destinations comparable to Romania 
in cluster 4. However, the countries of cluster 4 are 
rated worse in the GCI variables and the country 
rating. The manufacturing share in Latvia lies below 
average. Cluster 5, containing Croatia, Cyprus, Ita-
ly, Portugal and Spain, is characterized by countries 
with economic difficulties, high unemployment 
rates and mostly a low country rating between BBB 
and BB+. Furthermore, they have a low rank in the 
GCI indicators. 
Table 3 Country clusters
No. Countries
1 Ireland
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom
3 Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
4 Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania
5 Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Spain
6 Greece
Source: Own calculation based on of Eurostat, 20196, Schwab, 20187 and CountryEconomy, 20198 




Sum of squares df Mean Square df
Share of Manufacturing 107.175 5 26.663 22 4.020 0.010
Growth Rate 1076.631 5 29.745 22 36.195 0.000
Unemployment Rate 52.703 5 4.155 22 12.684 0.000
Total employment (persons) 264.359 5 67.639 22 3.908 0.011
Manufact. employment (persons) 397.519 5 28.213 22 14.090 0.000
Labour costs in manufacturing 837.846 5 29.910 22 28.012 0.000
GCI Institutions 346.816 5 18.781 22 18.466 0.000
GCI Skills 165.236 5 19.419 22 8.509 0.000
CGI Infrastructure 29.864 5 45.413 22 0.658 0.659
Standard & Poor’s Rating 64.817 5 2.379 22 27.244 0.000
The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters have been chosen to maximize the diffe-
rences among cases in different clusters. The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be 
interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal. 
Source: Own calculation based on of Eurostat, 20196, Schwab, 20187 and CountryEconomy, 20198.
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5. Discussion and conclusion
The stated aim of the European Commission was to 
enlarge the manufacturing share to 20% by 2020. It 
is not foreseeable yet that this aim could be reached. 
The manufacturing share increased since the finan-
cial crisis from 13.3% in 2009 to 14.6% in 2018, but 
is still on a lower level than in 2000 when it stood at 
16.7%. In the observation period from 2000 to 2018 
a clear trend of de-industrialization was found. Re-
industrialization took place only in Poland.
During the last decade countries with a manufac-
turing share of more than 20% were quite successful 
in terms of both economic growth and decreasing 
unemployment. 
In addition, they overcame the financial crisis quite 
quickly. Nonetheless, other countries with a com-
parably low manufacturing share were also suc-
cessful, for example, Sweden, Luxembourg or the 
United Kingdom with competitive advantages in 
the service sector. Countries with a development 
level below the EU 28 average have manufacturing 
shares both above and below average. Between the 
manufacturing share and economic growth a low 
but statistically significant correlation was found 
for the EU in total and for countries with a manu-
facturing share above average, but not for those 
below average. Such a correlation could not be cal-
culated with employment variables. As is generally 
well known, unemployment is influenced by a wide 
range of determinants, which were not included in 
this study. 
Hence it could be questioned if the EC’s general re-
industrialization advice is adequate for all member 
countries. The result of the cluster analysis shows 
that similarities between EU countries are influ-
enced by several institutional and macroeconomic 
determinants. The manufacturing share plays a mi-
nor role.
In this paper the emphasis was laid on the re-in-
dustrialization aim and the EC’s associated expec-
tations. One limitation of this paper is the fact that 
other influencing determinants on growth and 
employment were not taken into account. Another 
limitation is the fact that the manufacturing sec-
tor was considered as a whole. A detailed analysis 
of particular branches might give deeper insights. 
Furthermore, the influence of EU and country-spe-
cific political programs was not taken into account.
Further research can look more closely at the devel-
opment of the increasing intra-industrial trade in 
manufacturing between the EU countries referring 
to branches. This could show economic intercon-
nections between manufacturing operators within 
the EU countries. In addition, it would be interest-
ing to analyze the indirect effects of manufactur-
ing on growth and employment in other sectors. 
Moreover, strong offshoring connections between 
some branches in different EU countries due to FDI 
flows and global sourcing might influence the L-ad-
vantage of different production agents within and 
between the European countries.
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Figure 7 Curve fit regression: Observations and fit lines for re- and de-industrializations*
Austria Belgium Croatia Estonia
Finland France Italy Latvia
Luxembourg Malta Poland Portugal
Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom
*plots are displayed only for significant regressions  
  Observation,       Fit line 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat, 20196 
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Regina Moczadlo
Reindustrijalizacija za poticanje rasta i 
zapošljavanja u Europskoj uniji 
Sažetak
Zbog posljedica financijske krize Europska komisija je 2010. donijela strategiju Europa 2020. U toj je stra-
tegiji Komisija naglasila potrebu za reindustrijalizacijom te kao cilj postavila povećanje udjela europske 
proizvođačke industrije u bruto domaćem proizvodu (BDP) s 14% na 20% do 2020. Namjera je bila ostvariti 
veću međunarodnu konkurentnost i ojačati potencijal otvaranja novih radnih mjesta na europskim trži-
štima rada. Pokrenuto je više inicijativa na razini EU-a te na nacionalnoj razini pojedinih država članica. 
Analiza u ovome radu, koja se temelji na literaturi i empirijskim podatcima, pokazuje da je vrlo upitno 
može li EU ostvariti zacrtani cilj reindustrijalizacije. Poljska je jedina država članica EU-a sa zamjetnim 
trendom reindustrijalizacije nakon 2000. Nadalje, čini se da utjecaj industrijalizacije na rast ovisi o veličini 
udjela proizvođačke industrije. Nije se mogla utvrditi izravna povezanost reindustrijalizacije i zapošljava-
nja. Zemlje poput Švedske i Ujedinjene Kraljevine, koje su prolazile kroz deindustrijalizaciju, također su se 
oporavile od financijske krize za dvije godine i otada imaju iznadprosječne stope rasta. Prema tome, udio 
proizvođačke industrije sam po sebi vjerojatno nije uvijek odlučujuća varijabla za rast i zapošljavanje. Sto-
ga je upitno je li cilj reindustrijalizacije, kako ga je postavila Europska komisija, jednako prikladan za sve 
države članice EU-a.
Ključne riječi: reindustrijalizacija, deindustrijalizacija, proizvodnja, rast, zapošljavanje
